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Summary
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structures of the agents.
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1. Introduction
The main problem raised by the multiplicity of noncooperative equilibria in
strategic form games – that is the difficulty for the players to coordinate their
actions properly – has its counterpart in mechanism design. Even if a mechanism
has an equilibrium outcome with some desirable property, it may have other
equilibrium outcomes and a lack of coordination may lead to undesirable ones.
However, in mechanism design, by the very definition of the exercise, the selection
arguments used for games may be supplemented by some adequate modification
of the constructed mechanism. Starting from a given mechanism with mutiple
equilibrium outputs, a new mechanism could be constructed having the “good”
outcome as the unique equilibrium.
Since Maskin (1977, 1986) contributions on Nash implementation – introducing
this line of research – much effort has been oriented towards the identification of
conditions that characterize, for various classes of environments, unique (or full)
implementation of desirable social outcomes via mechanisms, under both complete
and incomplete information. For Bayesian implementation, most of the work has
dealt with the extension of Maskin’s monotonicity condition, namely Bayesian
monotonicity 1. Palfrey (1992) presents a good survey of the state of the literature
on this topic.
Bayesian monotonicity restricts jointly the utilities and the probabilities. But,
in the same paper, Palfrey shows (for direct mechanisms and allowing unlimited
transferability of the utilities) that unique implementation may reduce to incentive
compatibility under some conditions imposed on the belief structure only. One
of these conditions, however, is specially restrictive by requiring that at least one
agent to be uninformed (i.e. of a single possible type), thus allowing the “modi-
fied” mechanism to base the elimination of undesirable equilibria on this agent’s
behavior. The modification of the direct mechanism relies on an augmentation of
1. This was introduced by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986).
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the message space to specific non-type messages, of the kind already introduced in
Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988) and used by Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990).
In the present paper, while keeping transferable utility and using the same
kind of augmented mechanism to “selectively eliminate” undesirable equilibria,
we get unique implementation under a weaker set of belief restrictions that do
not require the presence of an uninformed agent. We first consider the traditional
auction problem, with independent valuations. With no additional assumption,
a modification of the rules of the auction – implying a larger message space
– guarantees to the seller the desired expected revenue. This is a property of
essentially unique implementability. More precisely, taking any auction, and a
“good” equilibrium of this auction for the seller, we construct an other auction in
which every equilibrium provides him the same expected payoff.
Then, for direct auction mechanisms and without restricting to independent
beliefs, we show that unique implementation obtains under a simple (and generic)
condition on the variability of the beliefs. In fact it will appear that this result is
not linked to the auction interpretation of the model. It applies to a wide class of
environments. As we will finally show, this includes the provision of a public good
by a central planner, imposing transfers and balancing its budget.
2. Auctions with Independent Valuations:
Essentially Unique Implementation
2.1. Beliefs and Utilities
We consider a situation in which a seller denoted 0, sells an object to a number
of potential buyers N = {1, . . . , i, . . .n}. The characteristic, or type, of buyer i ∈ N ,
takes values in a finite set Ai. We denote A = ×i∈NAi the set of states of nature
(and A–i = ×j,iAj). An outcome is a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xi, . . . ,xn) ∈ℜ
n
+, where xi ≥ 0
is the probability that buyer i ∈N gets the object, assuming
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1 (there is a
probability that the seller keeps the object). Let X be the set of possible vectors x.
The valuation for buyer i ∈N is given by the real-valued function ui(x;α), x ∈X ,
α ∈A. Valuations are measured in money and the payoff for agent i ∈N making
a payment yi ∈ ℜ when the outcome is x ∈ X and α ∈ A is the state of nature is
ui(x;α) + yi. Observe that the utility of each buyer, as defined, might be affected
by the types of all others. A standard case in auction theory, however, where this
influence disappears, is given by ui(x;α) = xiWi(αi), where Wi(αi) stands for the
willingness to pay for the object of player i when of type αi (this is the case used in
the example below in 2.4). To make things simple we consider that the object has
no value for the seller who only collects the payments from the buyers (although
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the reader will easily see that this does not change the results at all). The seller is
an uninformed player, whereas buyers have private information about their own
types.
Before the auction starts, the seller has a probability distribution p over the set
A of states of nature. The buyer i ∈N knows his true type αi ∈Ai and we assume
that his beliefs over A–i given αi ∈Ai are consistent with p and given by p(α–i | αi).
We also assume (without loss of generality) that for every i ∈ N and αi ∈ Ai, the
marginal pi(αi) =
∑
α–i
p(α–i,αi) is strictly positive. In this section we concentrate
on the independent case where p(α) = ×i∈Npi(αi).
An auction problem is given by (A,p,X , (ui)i∈N ), where (A,p) is also called the
belief structure.
2.2. Auction Mechanisms
The auction is conducted as follows. Each potential buyer i ∈N reports a bid to
the seller. This bid is a message mi ∈Mi in a finite set Mi. For m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈
M = ×i∈NMi, bidder i pays an amount ti(m) and receives the object with probability
si(m).
An auction mechanism is a triple (M ,s, t) where s :M → X is called the outcome
function and t : M →ℜN is the payment scheme. Note that we are making no
assumption about the type of auction.
An auction mechanism determines a game with incomplete information. A
Bayesian equilibrium is a vector of strategies m˜ = (m˜1, . . . ,m˜i, . . . ,m˜n) where, for
every i ∈N , m˜i is a function from Ai into Mi and
∀i ∈N , ∀αi ∈Ai, ∀mi ∈Mi :
(1)∑
α–i
(ui(s(m˜(α));α) + ti(m˜(α)))p(α–i | αi) ≥ (2)
∑
α–i
(ui(s(mi,m˜–i(α–i));α) + ti(mi,m˜–i(α–i)))p(α–i | αi).
2.3. Essentially Unique Implementation
Given an auction mechanism, the associated game of incomplete information
may have several equilibria leading to more or less advantageous expected payoff
to the seller. For instance, following Myerson (1981) the optimal auction that leads
to the maximum expected revenue to the seller can be computed. However, this
no 17 - 2005 / 2
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maximum expected revenue is only obtained for one equilibrium, and nothing
guarantees that this equilibrium will obtain. In this section we show how to build
a new (associated) mechanism in which all equilibria give the same revenue to the
seller than the “good” equilibrium.
Formally, consider a mechanism (M ,s, t) and an equilibrium m˜ where the seller’s
expected payoff is given by the expected revenue
∑
α (
∑
i ti(m˜(α))p(α). Another auc-
tion mechanism (M,σ,τ) is said to implement essentially uniquely the equilibrium
m˜ of (M ,s, t) if, for all equilibria µ˜ of (M,σ,τ) the expected revenue of the seller is
the same: ∑
α
∑
i
τi(µ˜(α))
p(α) =∑
α
∑
i
ti(m˜(α))
p(α). (3)
Proposition 2.1 – Take any equilibrium m˜ associated to any auction mechanism
(M ,s, t). With independent beliefs, there exists an auction mechanism (M,σ,τ) that
implements m˜ essentially uniquely.
Proof. Let Θi be the set of all functions θi :M–i →ℜ such that either θi(m–i) = 0
for all m–i ∈ M–i or
∑
α–i
θi(m˜–i(α–i))p(α–i) < 0. That is θi belongs to Θi if at the
truthtelling equilibrium of the original auction, it would either be identically 0, or
would yield strictly negative expected payoff to bidder i.
We consider the auction mechanism (M,σ,τ) where Mi =Mi×Θi and for every
i ∈N ,
σi((m1,θ1), . . . (mn,θn)) = si(m1, . . . ,mn),
and
τi((m1,θ1), . . . , (mn,θn)) = ti(m) + θi(m–i).
Since, in the extended auction mechanism, a nonzero transfer θi gives a negative
expected payoff to bidder i, it is an equilibrium for every bidder i ∈ N of type
αi ∈Ai to play (m˜i(αi),0) ∈Mi. Then, the expected revenue of the seller is the same
as at the original equilibrium of the original auction mechanism.
We now show that all equilibria of the new mechanism satisfy condition (3).
In fact we shall show something stronger: All equilibria of (M,σ,τ) generate the
same distribution on M as that induced by the good equilbrium of the original
mechanism. Assume that this were not the case for some equilibrium denoted
µ˜′ = (m˜′, θ˜′), with m˜′
i
:Ai →Mi and θ˜
′
i
:Ai →Θi. There would then exist i, m
+
i
and
m–
i
such that ∑
{αi:m˜i(αi)=m
+
i
}
pi(αi) > H
+ >
∑
{αi:m˜
′
i
(αi)=m
+
i
}
pi(αi),
∑
{αi:m˜i(αi)=m
–
i
}
pi(αi) < H
– <
∑
{αi:m˜
′
i
(αi)=m
–
i
}
pi(αi).
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For any j , i, let
θj(m
+
i ,m–{i,j}) = –KH
–,
θj(m
–
i ,m–{i,j}) = KH
+,
θj(m) = 0, if mi < {m
+
i ,m
–
i }.
Then for any K > 0, the function θj is an acceptable second component of the
annoucement by bidder j, as∑
{αi:m˜i(αi)=m
–
i
}
pi(αi)H
+ –
∑
{αi:m˜i(αi)=m
+
i
}
pi(αi)H
– < 0.
Furthermore given that∑
{αi:m˜
′
i
(αi)=m
–
i
}
pi(αi)H
+ –
∑
{αi:m˜
′
i
(αi)=m
+
i
}
pi(αi)H
– > 0,
bidder j will find it profitable to deviate, for K large enough, since any loss of
utility stemming from the change in the allocation of the good will be more than
offset by the increase in his income. This eliminates the “bad” equilibrium.
In this proof the original mechanism is transformed by augmenting the message
spaces. Each bidder i is allowed to propose an additional transfer scheme, as long
as these transfers give him negative expected payoff in the original equilibrium.
The seller, being the mechanism designer, should play the role of a guarantee for
these transfers. Since this at the same time ensures the realization of the “good”
equilibrium, where no additional transfers are made, it is in his own interest, as
illustrated by the simple example that we present next.
2.4. An Example
In this example we use the technique described above on a first price auction
to eliminate bad equilibria. There are two bidders, each with valuation equal to 0
or 1, with probability 1/2 each. In the optimal first price auction, they are allowed
to make a closed bid of 0 or 2/3. We have the standard rules of a first price auction
with the good being allocated to each bidder with probability 1/2 if they bid the
same amount. With these rules, there are two equilibria. With obvious notation in
the “good” equilibrium
m˜i(0) = 0, m˜i(1) = 2/3, for all i,
and in the bad equilibrium
m˜i(0) = m˜i(1) = 0.
It is easy to see that the bad equilibrium is better from the viewpoint of the bidders.
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Change now the rules as follows. Each bidder is allowed to a give a special
signal to the seller (raise a ”flag”, for example) amounting to propose an additional
transfer scheme. When one bidder raises a flag, the auction goes on as before but
the bidder who raised the flag receives 10 from the seller, if the other bid is 0, and
pays 12 to the seller, if the other bid is 2/3. In the good equilibrium, it does not
pay to raise a flag, but it does in the bad equilibrium, which is therefore eliminated.
It is possible to show that no new equilibrium is introduced.
3. Auctions: Unique Implementation
The preceding result has two limitations. First it uses a weak notion of
uniqueness. Second it imposes the strong condition of independence on the
valuation distribution. In this section we consider auctions as “direct mechanisms”
and, in this simplified framework, we remove these limitations, first, by imposing
on the beliefs another condition which does not require independence and is
generic, and, second, by using a stronger notion of uniqueness.
3.1. Direct Mechanisms and Unique Implementation
For a given auction problem (A,p,X, (ui)i∈N ), an associated direct auction
mechanism is a mechanism (M ,s, t) where for every i, Mi =Ai. For each individual
the possible bids are identified to the set of possible valuations: A message consists
in announcing a valuation. The outcome function s and the payment scheme t are
now functions of the announced valuations. By the revelation principle, one can
always associate to any chosen auction mechanism and equilibrium, respectively a
payoff-equivalent direct mechanism and the corresponding truthtelling equilibrium.
The equilibrium conditions in the direct mechanisms are specified by the following
Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) constraints, inducing the bidders to truthful
revelation.
∀ i ∈N , ∀ αi ∈Ai, ∀ ai ∈Ai,∑
α–1
(ui(s(α),α) + ti(α))p(α–i | αi) ≥ (4)
∑
αi
(ui(s(ai,α–i),α) + ti(ai,α–i))p(α–i | αi)
For any BIC mechanism (A,s, t), another auction mechanism (M,σ,τ) is said
to implement uniquely the truthtelling equilibrium of (A,s, t) if and only if, for all
equilibria µ˜ of (M,σ,τ), we have: σ(˜µ(α)) = s(α) and τ(˜µ(α)) = t(α) for all α.
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For an auction mechanism to be BIC and to give maximal surplus to the seller,
there are known conditions imposed on the beliefs alone (see Crémer and McLean,
1988). The purpose is now to find additional conditions, also imposed on the
beliefs alone, in order to ensure unique implementation.
3.2. Conditions for Unique Implementation
In this section, for simplicity, we impose the following additional assumption
(weaker ones could be imposed):∑
{αk:αk∈Ak,i,k,j}
p(α–i | αi) ≡ p(αj | αi) > 0 for all αi and αj (5)
This assumption, which holds for nearly all information structures, will allow
us to prove the following result.
Proposition 3.1 – For any BIC mechanism (A,s, t), there exists an auction
mechanism (M,σ,τ) implementing uniquely the truthtelling equilibrium of (A,s, t),
whenever
p(α–i | αi) , p(α
′
–i
| α′
i
)
for all i ∈N, all α, α′ ∈A, α , α′.
(6)
Condition (6) holds for nearly all information structures.
The inequalities (6) plays a role 2 similar to that of condition NCD (No Con-
sistent Deceptions), introduced by Matsushima (1990). The proof of proposition 1
goes through the following steps:
– we introduce a new condition ACCUI (A Condition Concerning Unique
Implementation), which is of independent interest and, as proved in lemma 1,
rather transparently ensures unique implementation for any BIC mechanism;
– we show in lemma 2 that if condition (6) holds, condition ACCUI also holds;
– lemma 3 shows that condition (6) holds generically;
Let us start by stating the new condition:
2. Such conditions are indispensable if we are to find conditions on information structures alone
that guarantee unique implementation. To see this, consider the case where the same utility function is
attached to two different types. We can only guarantee unique implementation if the types generate
different probability distributions over the types of the other agents.
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Condition 1 (Condition ACCUI) A belief (A,p) structure satisfies condition ACCUI
if and only if for all i and all bijections 3 γ : A–i → A–i, not equal to the identity
mapping, there exists an α′
i
such that the system{ ∑
α–i∈A–i t˜i(α–i)p(γ(α–i) | α
′
i
) > 0∑
α–i∈A–i t˜i(α–i)p(α–i | αi) < 0 for all αi , α
′
i
has a solution t˜i :A–i →ℜ.
Notice that Condition ACCUI has an equivalent dual version (by standard results
on linear systems):
Condition 2 (Condition ACCUI∗) An information structure satisfies condition ACCUI ∗
if and only if for all i and all bijections c : A–i → A–i, not equal to the identity
mapping, there exists an α′
i
such that the system
p(c(α–i) | α
′
i ) =
∑
αi∈Ai
λ(αi)p(α–i | αi), for all α–i, (7)
λ(αi) ≥ 0, for all αi. (8)
does not have a solution in λ :Ai →ℜ.
The first step of the proof can now be performed.
Lemma 3.1 – Consider any BIC mechanism (A,s, t). If condition ACCUI holds,
there exists another mechanism (M,σ,τ) implementing uniquely the truthtelling
equilibrium of (A,s, t).
Proof. To build the new auction mechanism let us define, as in the proof of
Proposition 1, the set Θi of functions θi :A–i →ℜ such that either
θi(α–i) = 0 for all α–i ∈A–i
or ∑
α–i
θi(α–i)p(α–i | αi) < 0 for all αi ∈Ai. (9)
Agent i announces a type and a function in Θi, therefore Mi ≡Ai ×Θi. If for all
i ∈N the message is equal to (αi,θi) ∈Mi we have
x
(
(α1,θ1), . . . , (αn,θn)
)
= s(α),
τi
(
(α1,θ1), . . . , (αn,θn)
)
= ti(α) + θi(α–i) for all i.
As before, in the augmented mechanism, it is an equilibrium for every bidder i
of type αi to announce the message (αi,0), because truthtelling is an equilibrium of
3. This is somewhat stronger than we need. Only the bijections γ =
∏
j,i γj where γj is a bijection
from Aj into Aj need to be considered. This is true for all the bijections we consider.
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the original mechanism, and because the “extra” transfers can only yield negative
expected payoffs when the other bidders tell the truth. We now show that it is the
only equilibrium when ACCUI holds.
An equilibrium strategy µ˜i of agent i will be written (α˜i, θ˜i) with α˜i : Ai → Ai
and θ˜i : Ai →Θi. The reasoning of the preceding paragraph shows that there exists
no equilibrium in which all bidders announce their true types (α˜i(αi) = αi for all i
and all αi) and in which we have θ˜i not identically zero for some bidder. Therefore
in any candidate equilibrium (α˜, θ˜),with θ˜ not identically zero, at least one bidder
must lie about his type.
Assume first that there exists such a bidder j , i such that α˜j is not a bijection.
Then some α′′
j
∈Aj is never announced by agent j. By (5), for K large enough, the
function defined by
θi(α–i) =
 1 if αj , α
′′
j
,
–K if αj = α
′′
j
,
belongs to Θi and is a better second component of the message of i than {0}.
Because bidder i will want to announce as large a multiple of θi as possible, there
is no equilibrium where the α˜j’s are not all bijections.
Assume now that bidder j does not use the truthtelling strategy (α˜j(αj) , αj for
some αj), and for any i , j, and let γ be the inverse function of α˜–i. Then p(γ(α′–i) | α
′
i
)
is the probability that agent i assigns to the annoncement α′
–i
when he is of type α′
i
.
Let θi be equal to λ˜ti where λ is a very large real and t˜i : Ai →ℜ is the function
whose existence is guaranteed by condition ACCUI; θi belongs to Θi. Agent i will
find it a profitable second component of his message, and because the greater the λ
the better the response, we have eliminated all non-truthtelling equilibria.
We have therefore shown that, for the augmented mechanism, truthtelling is
an equilibrium, and that there is no non-truthtelling equilibrium. The lemma is
proved.
The second step of the proof of Proposition 1 is given by the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2 – If condition (6) holds, then ACCUI holds.
Proof. Without loss of generality, choose a bijection γ :A–1 →A–1, not equal
to the identity. Then there exists a state of nature α′, such that
γ(α′–1) , α
′
–1 (10)
and, by condition (6), such that
p(α′–1 | α
′
1) > p(α–1 | α1)
for all α , α′ such that γ(α–1) , α–1. (11)
From (10), and because γ and therefore γ–1 are bijections
α′–1 , γ
–1(α′–1). (12)
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From (11) and (12) we obtain
p(α′–1 | α
′
1) > p(γ
–1(α′–1) | α1) for all α1. (13)
The lemma will be proved when we will have shown that there exists an η > 0
such that the transfer function t˜1 defined by
t˜1(γ
–1(α′–1)) = 1 (14)
t˜1(α–1) = –η for all α–1 , γ
–1(α′–1) (15)
satisfies the conditions of the definition of ACCUI . To see this note that∑
α–1∈A–1
t˜1(α–1)p(γ(α–1) | α
′
1)
= t˜1(γ
–1(α′–1))p(α
′
–1 | α
′
1) –η(1 –p(α
′
–1 | α
′
–1))
= (1+η)p(α′–1 | α
′
1) –η (16)
and that for α1 , α
′
1∑
α–1∈A–1
t˜1(α–1)p(α–1 | α1)
= t˜1(γ
–1(α′–1))p(γ
–1(α′–1) | α1) –η (1 –p(γ
–1(α4–1) | α1))
= (1+η)p(γ–1(α′–1) | α1) –η. (17)
Equations (13), (16) and (17) imply∑
α–1∈A–1
t˜1(α1)p(γ(α–1) | α
′
1) >
∑
α–1∈A–1
t˜1(α1)p(α–1 | α
′
1),
and it is clear that if we take η just large enough that the left hand side of this
inequality is positive while the right hand side is negative, we will find the transfers
that we are looking for.
Lemma 3.3 – Condition (6) holds for nearly all belief structures.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that condition (6) holds for nearly all information
structures such that p(α) > 0 for all α. First, because the conditional probabilities
are continuous functions of the p(α)’s it is straightforward that the set of belief
structures that satisfy (6) contains an open neighborhhood of any of its elements.
Second, if some belief structure does not satisfy (6), we can find another probability
structure arbitrarily close that satisfies this property, by a proof similar to that used
in d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1990). The proof begins by showing
that we can modify slightly any information structure that does not satisfy (6) and
reduce the number of equalities between conditional probabilities. A sequence of
such reductions will lead to a belief structure that satisfies (6).
This completes the proof of proposition 1.
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3.3. The Case of Free Beliefs
Finally we turn to the case (implied by independence) of free beliefs:
p(α–i | αi) = p(α–i | α
′
i ) = p(α–i), for all α ∈A, αi ∈Ai, i ∈N .
In such a case the preceding result can be strenghtened:
Lemma 3.4 – Under free beliefs, condition (6) is equivalent to ACCUI .
Proof. It is sufficient to show that condition ACCUI∗ implies condition (6).
With free beliefs, the equalities in (7) become
p(γ(α–i)) =
∑
αi∈Ai
λ(αi)
p(α–i).
Summing both sides of this equation over all α–i ∈ A–i shows that
∑
αi∈Ai λ(αi) is
equal to 1, and therefore ACCUI ∗ is equivalent to the statement: for all i and for
all γ we do not have p(γ(α–i) = p(α–i), which proves the result.
4. Extension to Public Good Problems
The techniques that we have presented so far have been derived to solve auction
problems. However, it is possible to use them in many other contexts, including the
design by a public planner of mechanisms ensuring the efficient provision of some
public good or service. The main difference in such a context is the way in which
the transfers are affected. In auctions, we have assumed that the transfers were
payments made by the buyers to the seller, who designs the mechanism so as to
maximize the expected revenue. In the provision of a public good the transfers are
taken to cover the cost of the public good and to realise redistributions among the
consumers. The objective is to achieve efficiency and, may be, some redistributive
objective.
Formally the problem (A,p,X , (ui)i∈N ) can be viewed as being an abstract
framework and reinterpreted as a public good problem simply by taking N to be
the set of agents in the economy and X , the set of outcomes, to be states of the
economy that include the level of public goods. Still assuming that the utilities
are measured in money (perfect transferability), a mechanism (M ,s, t) and a direct
mechanism (A,s, t) are defined as before. The outcome function s now associates to
every vector of announced messages (which, in a direct mechanism, are announced
types) a state x in X . The transfer scheme t, which includes the required payments
for the production of public goods, have to satisfy a budget-balance equation:∑
i∈N
ti(m) = 0, for all m ∈M .
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To any mechanism (M ,s, t) can be associated a game of incomplete informa-
tion, and the concept of Bayesian equilibrium is still defined by (2). For direct
mechanisms, Bayesian incentive compatibility is defined accordingly, as in (4).
Unique implementation can be obtained by adding an assumption, imposed on
the beliefs only, such as condition (6). Indeed, Proposition 2 is straightforwardly
adapted to give
Proposition 4.1 – For any BIC mechanism (A,s, t), there exists a mechanism
(M,σ,τ) implementing uniquely the truthtelling equilibrium of (A,s, t), whenever
p(α–i | αi) , p(α
′
–i
| α′
i
)
for all i in N, and α, α′ in A.
(6)
Condition (6) holds for nearly all information structures.
Proof. The proof repeats the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2,
adapted to ensure that the constructed transfer scheme is budget-balanced. The
augmented mechanism is constructed as follows. For all agents i ∈N a message is
a vector (αi,θi) ∈Ai ×Θi such that
σ ((α1,θ1), . . . , (αn,θn)) = s(α), (as before)
τi ((α1,θ1), . . . , (αn,θn)) = ti(α) + θi(α–i) –
∑
j∈N–i
1
n–1
θj(α–j).
Hence the modified transfers are budget-balanced.
In d’Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (1997), we show that any outcome
function s can be implemented for generic beliefs, as long as there are at least
three agents. This yields the following corollary:
Corollary 4.1 – Assume that there are at least three agents. For any utility
functions ui of the agents, any outcome function s and nearly all information
structures, it is possible to find a mechanism that uniquely implement s.
Note, finally, that we have not required, as is often done, that the outcome
function s be (ex post) efficient in the sense that
s(m˜(α)) ∈ argmax
x∈X
∑
i∈N
ui(m˜(α)).
In the present framework, efficiency can also be ensured by conditions imposed
on the beliefs only. One such (weak) condition is the “compatibility condition”
introduced in d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979). 4
4. D’Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (1997) discuss the issue of the existence of efficient
mechanisms and introduce new conditions.
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5. Conclusion
In implementation theory, the position of the ”mechanism designer” remains
fuzzy, somewhat inside somewhat outside the game, the rules of which have to be
fixed and imposed. In the design of optimal auctions, the seller can be viewed as
the mechanism designer, since the rules of the auction are usually taken to be in
the seller’s best advantage. In the public good problem, the mechanism designer is
the group of all players acting collectively through a ”planner”.
For unique implementation under incomplete information via augmented rev-
elation mechanisms – the problem with have dealt with here –, a strenghtening
of the role of the mechanism designer is required. During the play of the game,
the players may strategically propose additional side-payments. These have to be
guaranteed. In the augmented auction mechanism, the seller might even have to
reward a deviating player, ”acting as a stool pigeon” in order to destroy equilibria
that are bad from the seller’s point of view. In the public good context, the point
of view is collective and the planner has to require that all side-payments balance.
In this paper, we have fully exploited the power given to the mechanism
designer in order to coordinate the equilibrium selection. An alternative approach
would be to introduce, with the purpose of coordinating on a good equilibrium, a
pre-play communication stage between players (as done in Palfrey and Srivastava
(1991)). The organization of such pre-play communication may be seen as a
supplementary instrument available to the mechanism designer. Maintaining
the tranferable utility assumption, we have concentrated our attention on the
instrument provided by transfers. In many given contexts with nontransferable
utility, more instruments are to be considered, exploiting the specific features of
the situation.
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